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ABSTRACT
Traditional key management techniques, such as public key cryptography or key distribution center (e.g.,  
Kerberos), are often not effective for wireless sensor networks for the serious limitations in terms of  
computational power, energy supply, network bandwidth. In order to balance the security and efficiency,  
we propose a new scheme by employing LU Composition techniques for mutual authenticated pairwise 
key establishment and integrating LU Matrix with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman for anonymous pathkey 
establishment. At the meantime, it  is able to  achieve efficient group key agreement and management.  
Analysis shows that the new scheme has better performance and provides authenticity and anonymity for  
sensor to establish multiple kinds of keys, compared with previous related works.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development and wide application of wireless sensor networks (WSN), more and 
more security problems are emerging. Especially for the sensor networks deployed in a hostile 
environment with various potential malicious attacks, the security issue is a top priority concern. 
To  ensure  security  in  a  wireless  sensor network,  it  is  essential  to  encrypt  messages  and 
authenticate the communicating nodes. Therefore, it is a major concern how to bootstrap secure 
communications between sensor nodes, i.e., how to set up secret keys between communicating 
nodes.
Since  the  key  establishment  is  the  initial  step  for  secure communication,  topics  on  key 
establishment, agreement and management has been studied for a long time. However, most of 
traditional key management schemes can not be applied to the WSN for the communication and 
computational limitations [1]. Currently, three main problems of WSN security are becoming 
hot. The first one is that how to enforce efficient security techniques for the resources-limited 
WSN. The second one is that how to possess the anonymity when the message are passed on 
multi-hop media. And the third one is that how to establish secure group communication inside 
the WSN [2].
1.1. Resources Constraints
Because  of  size,  form factor  and cost  considerations,  wireless sensor  networks  suffer  from 
severe resource constraints, such as communication bandwidth and range, computation power, 
memory  and energy.  Therefore,  WSN  has  a  demand  of  the  energy-efficiency  of  key 
establishment protocols. Traditional key establishment mainly includes public key cryptography 
which  requires  heavy  computations. New  techniques  should  be  developed  for  the  special 
conditions of WSN[3].
 1.2. Secure Path Key Agreement
Considering that the sensor nodes are dispersed when they are deployed, nodes sometimes have 
to communicate others by the routing on multi-hops of ad hoc network. That means if two un-
17
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol 1, No 2, July 2009
neighbored nodes are to agree on secret key with each other (We call it "path key agreement"), 
they have  to  send  their  secret  respective  message to  each  other  over  the  multi-hop media. 
Especially  if  the  network  is deployed  in  a  hostile  environment,  the  process  of  path  key 
agreement should not expose any sensitive information to the other parties even in an supposed 
secure channel.
1.3. Secure Group Communication
To  conserve  power,  intermediate  network  nodes  should  aggregate results  from  individual 
sensors. Aggregation collects results from several sensors and calculates a smaller message that 
summarizes  the important  information  from a  group  of  sensors.  For  example,  suppose the 
operator is interested in the average sensor reading for some value in the network. An inefficient 
way to find this would be for every sensor node to send its reading to the base station (possibly 
over multiple forwarding hops), and for the base station to calculate the average of all readings 
received. A more efficient way to collect the same information would be for intermediate nodes 
to forward the calculated average value of the readings they receive along with a count of the 
number  of  readings  it  incorporates.  Each node  then  calculates  the  average  for  all  of  its 
descendents and only need send that value and the number of descendants to its parent. We call 
it  "in-network process"[4][5].  This  group operation  needs  secure  group  communications. 
However, group key establishment is the bottle neck for secure group communication in WSN.
The  roadmap  of  this  paper  is  as  follows:  Section  2  gives  a  brief  overview  of  research 
background  related  to  our  scheme,  including  LU  composition  for  pairwise  key 
establishment,integrating  LU  composition  with  elliptic  curve  D-H  for  path-key 
establishment,and  tree-based  extension  of  LU  composition  for  group  key  establishment  . 
Section  3  illustrates  the  related  works  about  this  key  establishment  for  WSN.  Section   4 
describes our scheme to solve the problem. Lastly, Section 5 gives some concluding remarks 
about this paper, as well as briefly reporting the status of this piece of research work.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1. LU Matrix Key
Definition 1. If the multiplication result of a n*n lower triangular matrix L and a n*n 
upper triangular matrix U equals to a symmetric matrix K, namely K=LU. We say K is 
the "LU composition" of triangular matrices L and U.
Figure 1.  Key Matrix 
2.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [7] is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties 
to establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel. Suppose Alice wants to establish a 
shared key with Party Bob, but the only channel available for them may be eaversdropped by a 
third party. Both have agreed to a common and publicly known curve K over a finite field eg. 
F2p as well as to a base point P €K in advance.
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1. Alice randomly chooses kA, 1 < k < 2p and Bob accordingly kB, 1 < k < 2p. Now kA is 
considered as Alice’s private key, kB is Bob’s private key.
2. Alice computes her public key: QA = kAP, Bob does: QB = kBP.
3. Alice sends QA to Bob, Bob sends QB to Alice.
4. Alice can now compute the shared secret for her and Bob by equation secret = kAQB and 
Bob also by secret = kBQA. An eavesdropper knows only QA and QB but is not able to 
compute the secret from that. 
The details about the algorithm principle of ECDH can be referenced in [27].
2.3. Tree-based Group Key Agreement for Ad-hoc Networks
A common model for WSN is that sensors (or nodes) in the network are deployed in clusters 
[8]. We follow this model and assume that sensors in the same partition are close to each other 
and more  likely to  be  neighbours.  The most  popular  ways to  agree  on keys  and solve the 
continues  key  management problem  is  to  build  a  binary  tree  structure  in  each  node  [9]. 
Therefore, it can achieve efficient key management.
3. RELATED WORKS
According to the secure communication requirement in WSN, two kinds of key establishment 
are needed. One is pairwise key establishment,  the other is group key establishment.  A few 
schemes has been proposed which consist of three phases in general [10]:(1)key setup prior to 
deployment, (2)  shared-key discovery after deployment, and (3) path-key establishment if two 
sensor nodes do not share a direct key.
The most popular pairwise key pre-distribution solution is Random Pairwise Key Scheme [11] 
which addresses unnecessary storage problem and provides some key resilience. It is based on 
Erdos and Renyi’s [12] work. Each sensor node stores a random set of  Np  pair-wise keys to 
achieve probability p that two nodes are connected. Neighboring nodes can tell if they share a 
common pair-wise key after they send and receive ”Key Discovering” Message within radio 
range. Its  defect is that it  sacrifices key connectivity to decrease the storage usage.  Closest  
(location-based) pair-wise keys pre-distribution scheme [13] is an alternative to Random pair-
wise  key  scheme.  It  takes  advantage  of  the  location  information  to  improve  the  key 
connectivity. Later on, Random key-chain based key pre-distribution solution is another random 
key pre-distribution solutions which originated from the solution of basic probabilistic key pre-
distribution scheme [14]. It relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random 
graph.
There are several  key reinforcement  proposals to strengthen security of  the established link 
keys, and improve resilience. Objective is to securely generate a unique link or path key by 
using established keys, so that the key is not com- promised when one or more sensor node is 
captured. One approach is to increase amount of key overlap required in shared key discovery 
phase.  Q-composite  random  key  pre-distribution  scheme  [11]  requires  q  common  keys  to 
establish a link key. Similar mechanism is proposed by Pair-wise key establishment protocol 
[15] which uses threshold secret sharing for key reinforcement. The key reinforcement solutions 
in general increase processing and communication complexity, but provide good resilience in 
the sense that a compromised key-chain does not directly affect security of any links in the 
WSN. But, it may be possible for an adversary to re- cover initial link keys. An adversary can 
then recover reinforced link keys from the recorded multi-path reinforcement messages when 
the link keys are compromised. 
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Actually, due to the randomness of the key selection process in Random key pre-distribution 
schemes, none of the above key management schemes can guarantee that a pairwise key will be 
found between two nodes wanting to communicate,  and when the  number  of  compromised 
nodes exceeds a certain threshold their security decreases drastically. To address this issue, key 
matrix based dynamic key generation solutions introduced. All possible link keys in a network 
of size N can be represented as an N N key matrix. It is possible to store small amount of 
information to each sensor node, so that every pair of nodes can calculate corresponding field of 
the matrix, and uses it as the link key. The original idea is from Blom’s scheme [16]. Based on 
this work, [6] proposed a LU matrix key pre-distribution for WSN. It can guarantee that any pair 
of  nodes can find a pairwise key between themselves.  This is  achieved by using the secret 
information  assigned  from  the  lower  and  upper  triangular  matrixes  decomposed  from  a 
symmetric matrix of a pool of keys. Because all the established pairwise keys are distinct to 
each other,  any sensor’s compromise cannot  affect  the secure communication between non-
compromised nodes. However, it cannot guarantee anonymity when two nodes exceed radio 
range want to establish the path-key.
Considering in-network process such as data aggregation, we need to explore the way to build a 
secure group communication for WSN. Several group key management protocols have been 
proposed  for  mobile  ad-hoc  group  communication.  The  protocol  of  [17]  provides  efficient 
mutual  authentication and group key agreement for low-power mobile devices, and supports 
dynamic changes. However,  it  requires a wireless infrastructure with some powerful  trusted 
server (base station)  that performs heavy computations, which is not allowed according to the 
trust model in WSN. [18], [19], [20] proposed some key management and related schemes for 
wireless ad hoc network. Unfortunately, they all assume that after sensors are deployed, they are 
considered static. Thus it cannot solve the problem of key management when new members join 
or old members leave. To solve this problem, tree-based schemes are introduced to make key 
management more effective and efficient. [21] has analyzed and optimized a number of CGKA 
protocols (i.e., BD [22], CLIQUES [23], STR [24] ,TGDH [25] and [29, 30,31,32]) from the 
perspective of static and dynamic mobile ad-hoc groups. The optimized way relies on the the 
tree-based extension of the well-known elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol 
(ECDH). However, public key cryptography solutions are still  not the first  choice for WSN 
since its high computational overhead.
4.TKLU  SCHEME(TREE-BASED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL WITH LU  MATRIX 
COMPOSITION)
4.1 Overview
Tree-based key exchange protocol  with LU Matrix Composition(TKLU) has three protocols 
which are Pairwise key establishment protocol, Path Key establishment protocol and group key 
establishment protocol. (1)Sensor nodes who are neighboring can establish pairwise key after 
they are deployed by LU composition technique. And they are able to authenticate each other in 
the process of pairwise key establishment. (2)Sensor nodes who are not neighboring should 
establish secret keys over the multi-hop path. They can achieve to agree on keys in unsecure 
channel. Even if the third parties obtain the message they can not deduce the keys. It also can 
achieve authenticity at the same time. (3)Those neighborhood nodes can agree on group key for 
secure data aggregation.
Table 1.  Notations.
A,B,C,….M1,…Mn. Node identities
SM symmetric matrix
GF(q) finite filed
Aix The row of node i
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Ayi The colum of node i
Kij Mediate value of keys
Tii Groups 
ri Random number
KCi A key chain maintained by node i
4.2 Phase 1:Key Pre-distribution
Step 1: Base Generation
1. The base station generates a large pool of keys(e.g. 520 or more). The keys are selected from a 
finite filed GF(q) to create a symmetric matrix(SM). Where q is the smallest prime larger than 
the key size.
2. The base station select one publicly known curve K over a finite field eg. F2p as well as to a 
base point P€K. 
Step2:Decompose Matrices to obtain LU Matrices
Base station does the decomposition of the created SM to obtain one lower triangular matrix A 
and one upper triangular matrix B.
Step3: Key Pre-distribution
Every node is randomly assigned one row from matrix A and one corresponding column from 
matrix B. For example, node i is assigned row Aix and column Byi, node j is assigned row Ajx 
and column Byj . After the key pre-distribution, each node only has two vectors in its memory. 
Each vector has n elements.
4.3 PHASE 2: KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Pairwise Key Establishment Protocol 
After key pre-distribution, each node can establish a pairwise key with its neighbors to make 
sure the secure around communication.
We design a protocol for the process of pairwise key establishment:
1. Node i sends its column Byi to node j.
2. After node j receive Byi, it computes Kji by vector multiplication of Bjx and Byj .
3. Node j reply the Byj ,F(Kji) where F(Kji) is the Hash result of the computation of the last 
step.
4.Upon receiving Byj , node i compute Kij and check if F(Kij) = F(Kji).
5.If it is verified, node i send F(Kij) to node j for the verification.
Path Key Establishment Protocol
Suppose node i and node j are not neighboring to each other. If they need to establish a secure 
communication channel, the first thing they have to do is to establish a path key between them. 
The steps are as follows( Figure 2):
1. Node i generates a random number ri, where 1 < ri < 2p, compute Qi = ri P. And node i sends 
Byi;Qi to node j over routing.
2. Upon node j receive the path key request from node i, node j generates a random number rj , 
where 1 < rj < 2p, compute Qj = rijP. At the same time, node j computes Kji by vector 
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multiplication of Byi and Byj .
3. After that, node j reply the message Byj ; F(Kji);Qj to node i. If receiving Byj ;Qj , node i  
compute Kij and check if F(Kij) = F(Kji). If it is verified, it computes Qij =riQj and reply a 
message with F(Kij); F(Qij). Otherwise, it broadcast an error message.
4. Upon receiving F(Kij); F(Qij), node j check if F(Kji) = F(Kij) and F(Qji) = F(Qij).
                                        Figure 2 Path Key Establishment Protocol
Through the protocol, node i and j can establish a path key Qij (or Qji)with authenticating each 
other. The biggest merit is that any other parties cannot deduce the final path key even they can 
eavesdrop the channel for the discrete logarithm problems.
Group Key Establishment Protocol
As figure 3 shows, suppose there are  n members who wish to form a group (key tree). The 
shallowest  rightmost  leaf  node  is  chosen  as  the  sponsor.  First,  all  members  are  ordered 
according to some criteria to be M1, M2… ,Mn. Then the first two members, M1 and M2, execute a 
2-party pairwise key exchange presented above. The same do the members Mi and Mi+1, where i  
is an even integer from [0, n]. Now we have n=2 groups. Each sponsor broadcasts then its tree 
with all blinded keys. The rest process is similar to be the one in the first round, if we consider a 
member as a group with only one member. Such process is repeated until all members are in one 
group. After  ith round the number of  groups is  reduced to  n=2i.  The setup of the group is 
finished after logn2 rounds. An example with n= 6 as shown in figure 3. Assume the order of 
members is  M1,  M6. In the first round  M1 and  M2 perform a pairwise key establishment and 
forms a new group TI1 . Similarly, groups TI2 of  M3 and M4, and TI3 of M5 and M6 are formed 
respectively. In the second round,  M2,  M4 broadcasts their trees with respective blinded keys. 
Then groups TI1 and TI2 form a new group TII1, TI3 do nothing and is renamed to TII2 . Finally the 
only two groups TII1 and TII2 form the group TIII consisting of all members. Then a group key tree 
is built up.
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                                                   Figure 3 Group Key Establishment Protocol 
5．DISCUSSION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
5.1 DISCUSSION FOR SECURITY
Compromised Keys Revocation Compromised keys should be removed from the wireless sensor 
networks immediately. In our proposed scheme, each node knows its neighbor’s ID and shares a 
unique  pairwise  communication  key  only  with  an  intended  1-hop  neighbor.  Those  nodes 
between several-hop distance shares path keys. Each node also shares some group keys inside 
its  group  after  the  nodes  are  deployed.  Once  a  misbehaving  node  which  was  captured  or 
compromised by the adversary is detected (we do not discuss malicious node detection in this 
paper.  Reader  can  reference  [26]  or  other  related  articles),  all  its  1-hop  neighbor  nodes 
immediately remove  the  corresponding pairwise  keys  shared with it.  At  the same time,  the 
leader in the group including the malicious node broadcasts the group key revocation process to 
update group keys. Other nodes which have shared path keys with it remove those path keys 
instantly.  Moreover, the misbehavior node ID will be sent to the sink node to broadcast the 
entire network about this node removal message. Each node needs to check whether it has keys 
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shared with this node.
Another security concern is resiliency to Node Capture. Once adversaries capture sensor nodes, 
they can obtain the secret information inside such as communication keys and other sensitive 
data. Actually, node capture attach is the biggest threat in wireless sensor networks. On the area 
of key establishment for wireless sensor networks, several key pre-distribution schemes are very 
popular. The main idea is that each sensor node has m keys which are randomly drawn from a 
key pool. If two nodes have one common key, they will create a communication link by using 
the key. The most popular random key pre-distribution schemes are from Eschenauer’s random 
key pre-distribution  scheme  [14]  and  Adrian’s  ”q-composite”  scheme  [11];Comparing  with 
those schemes, we can achieve zero fraction of compromised keys in non compromised sensor 
nodes with the increasing numbers of sensors.
5.2 MEMORY ANALYSES 
The tradition solutions for key establishment has two ways. One extreme solution in terms of 
resource usage is to deploy single master key to all sensors. Since, an adversary may capture a 
node and compromise the key very easily, it has very low resilience. The other extreme is to use 
distinct pair-wise keys for all possible pairs in the WSN. For a network of size N, each sensor 
node i (1<=i <= N) should pre-stores a key-chain KCi = {Kij|i≠j and 1<=j<= N} of size N-1 
out of N(N -1)=2 distinct keys. Node i stores a unique pair-wise key for each one of N-1 sensor 
nodes in the WSN. Actually, this solution is a very exhaustive one which creates unnecessary 
storage burden on a sensor node although this solution has very good key resilience.
Our  scheme  can  perform  better  memory  storage  than  pure  pairwise  key  pre-distribution 
schemes.  Before  the  deployment,  sensor  nodes  are  preloaded with 2 vectors  which have  N 
figures(While, in most of other pairwise key establishment schemes, keys are preloaded into 
sensor  nodes).  After  deployment,  for  dense  sensor  fields  (suppose average  k  neighbors  per 
node), one node needs stores k pairwise keys. In addition, Suppose naturally the deployment of 
sensors divides the sensors into m groups, on average, each group has n = N/m (N is the network 
size) sensors inside. Thus each sensor should have k pairwise keys and Log(n) group keys(here 
path key can be ignored as a small number). The number of keys in each sensor
should be k + Log(N/m). For a very high-density networks such as dense sensor fields (about 40 
neighbors per node), a high-density group which consists of 50 to 80 nodes(suppose the whole 
number of a general network sensors is 2000), one node only needs store around 40 + 7 = 47 
keys after key establishment.
       5.3 EXPERIMENT
We implement our scheme on MICA2.  The Berkeley MICA2 mote has a 7.3MHz processor 
with 128 KB flash memory,  4.0 KB RAM, and a Chipcon CC1000 radio at 19.2 Kbps. Our 
experiments employ Tiny OS (TOS) as the sensor operating system [6, 4], executing on MICA2 
motes.  We  tested  the  key  setup  time  for  the  two  key  setup  protocols:  pairwise  key 
establishment,  path  key establishment  and  group  key  establishment.  Here,  we  used  two to 
twenty motes to execute our key setup schemes. Every node can communicate with every other 
node. This simulates the different densities of sensor networks, from each node having only one 
neighbor to each node having nine neighbors.
Figure  4 shows the  total  time  for  our  key establishment  schemes.  First,  we see that  as  the 
network becomes denser, the time for pairwise key establishment grows longer. For example, 
for a two node network, the time for pairwise key setup is about 0.21 seconds, and for a ten 
node network, the time is about 2.77 seconds.  Another finding is that the number of messages 
for the key setup scheme will significantly affect the completion time for that protocol as the 
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density increases.
                                                       Figure 4  Time delay of Key establishment
To provide more details, Table 2 shows the total time delay of seting up pairwise keys  and 
group keys, and average time delay of path keys.  This table confirms two observations from 
figure 4: 1) Path keys and pairwise keys establishment are relative low cost; 2) It still cost less 
than the new key management schemes [28, 29, 30]. 
Table 2.  Time delay of key establishment (Second).
Nodes number Pairwise key 
(total time)
Path key
 (Average)
Group key 
(Total time)
2 0.21 0.21 0.21
3 0.48 0.79 0.71
4 0.78 0.79 1.25
5 0.93 0.81 1.58
6 1.301 0.81 2.31
7 1.402 0.82 2.58
8 1.98 0.825 3.77
9 2.92 0.83 5.71
10 3.01 0.91 6.02
11 3.11 0.92 6.35
12 3.21 0.95 6.67
13 4.52 1.2 9.53
14 4.81 1.6 10.11
15 6.01 1.87 10.2
16 7.01 1.89 10.3
17 6.73 1.95 10.6
18 7.05 1.98 12.1
19 7.33 2.1 12.8
20 7.9 2.2 15.08
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In  this  paper,  we  introduce  a  new  scheme  that  can  be  used  for  establish  various 
keys(pairwise keys, path keys and group keys) for wireless sensor networks. It can achieve 
quick authenticity without extra computations and communications. The experiment result 
shows the performance of TKLU is invigorating.
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